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Abstract
This paper analyses the stability of bargaining solutions in a family consisting of two parents
and one adult child, by developing a non-cooperative family game. Assuming different
bargaining powers between parents and the child, we find that the greater bargaining power
of the parents allows them to take greater gains from the cooperation, and reduce the
incentives to deviate from the cooperative agreement. The presence of altruism between the
players will significantly reduce the probability that there will be incentives to break the
cooperative agreement. A higher level of altruism increases the stability of cooperation, and
will overcome the contrary effect of other factors.
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1. Introduction 
The application of bilateral bargaining models represents an important advance in the study 
of family decision-making. One of the essential features of these bargaining models is that 
family demand does not depend solely on total family resources, but also on those 
controlled by each member individually. This implies that the results achieved depend on 
whatever is the threat point or status quo of the bargaining process, for example, the divorce 
situation. In this way, the family bargaining models reflected in the literature consider the 
decisions made by individuals to be the result of an explicitly defined bargaining solution 
(Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Chen and  Woolley, 2001; Andaluz 
and Molina, 2007a, 2007b). 
Nevertheless, divorce does not represent the only possible threat point in a process of 
this nature. In this sense, a non-cooperative equilibrium could equally be the threat point in 
the bargaining process, in such a way that the repeated interaction between the agents over 
time can tacitly lead to efficient results  (Lundberg and  Pollak, 1993, 1994). More 
specifically, and in accordance with the folk theorem, a Pareto-efficient solution can be 
derived as a Nash equilibrium in a repeated game, always provided that there is some 
strategy which penalizes all deviations from the efficient solution. Therefore, Pareto-
optimum results can arise as repeated game solutions. However, it has also recently been 
shown that the achievement of private gains on the part of each spouse, combined with the 
limitations in compromising the future behavior of both spouses, can give rise to decisions 
that are no longer Pareto-efficient (Lundberg and Pollak, 2003). 
In this context, the objective of this paper is to analyze the stability of bargaining 
solutions by developing a supergame where the players are two spouses and an adult child.  
Under a particular specification of the individual preferences, and given the existence of a 
family public good, we analyze the effects of altruism and bargaining power on the 
maintenance of the agreement derived from the Nash bargaining solution.  
 
2. The model 
We develop a repeated game in which the three members of a family can contribute 
voluntarily to the supply of one household public good. After assuming that we do not know 
the moment at which the dissolution of the family takes place, the objective of each agent is 
to maximize the discounted value of a flow of utilities  )  (j U U U Wj
t





− δ , 
where δ denotes the discount factor, common to all agents, and Wj(U1,U2,,U3) indicates the 
welfare function of agent j, which itself depends on the agent’s utility level, Uj and on that 
of  the  other  agents.  Formally,  each  player  has  a  welfare  function  of  the  type                        
Wj = Uj + s (Uk+Uh) with s ∈ [0, 1] denoting the degree of altruism of the players, which it 
assumes, for simplification purposes, to be common to all agents (“caring preferences”). 
The utility of each agent is represented by a function of the type 
3 , 2 , 1 ); , , , ( = = j z Q l C U U j j j j , where Cj represents a Hicksian composite good, whose price 
is unitary, lj denotes the quantity of leisure consumed by agent j, Q is a family public good 
whose technology is represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function, whose inputs are 
the hours dedicated to production by each agent, and z is a vector of subjective variables 
which determine the way in which each agent values his/her consumption. Specifically, the 
utilities are given by  jj j j h k UCL n l L n h ( 1) L ( h h ) j h k ; j , h , k 1 , 2 , 3 α α =+ + + − ∀ ≠ ≠ = , and 
the production function is  3 2 1 h h h Q = , with hj being the time dedicated to production of the 
family good by agent j, and α being a parameter indicating the subjective valuation of the 
contribution of agent j to the given good.   2
In the development of the non-cooperative equilibrium, each agent decides, given the 
decisions made by the other players, both the consumption of the private good and the 
contribution to the household public good. In this case, the solution of the one-shot game is 
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with i,j,k=(1,2,3), i≠j≠k, and T being the total time available for leisure, family production 
and work outside the home, yi being the non-labour income and wi being the individual 
hourly wage. From the first order conditions, we can obtain both the Hicksian consumption 
demands,  leisure time, and the individual contribution to the family public good, with the 
indirect utility functions being: 
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We should note that the repetition of the game gives rise to multiple equilibria, some 
of which must represent Pareto-efficient solutions. Indeed, all agents may implicitly create 
some strategy that avoids all possible deviation from an optimal solution, and which 
guarantees the achievement of Pareto-efficiency as a Nash equilibrium in the one-shot 
game. One of these possible strategies consists of penalizing the agent who unilaterally 
deviates from the agreement. More specifically, we adopt a relatively simple, but 
nevertheless commonly employed, punishment scheme, namely the trigger strategy, 
according to which the quantities of private and public good revert forever to non-
cooperative levels, following a deviation from the efficient solution on the part of one of the 
agents. The threat of punishment, through the return to the non-cooperative solution, is 
credible and guarantees the stability of solutions which are more efficient than the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium. 
Furthermore, and again for the sake of simplicity, we consider the case of stationary 
trajectories, arguing that a stationary trajectory is sustainable in a sub-game perfect 
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j W  denote the levels of welfare obtained by 
agent j in the Pareto-efficient solution derived from the Nash-bargaining agreement, and in 
the deviation equilibrium, respectively. Note that the second of these restrictions can be 













≥ , where  j δ  is the critical discount 
factor of individual j. Thus, the stability of the optimal solution requires that the discount 
factor, common to all individuals, is greater than or equal to the corresponding critical 
factor. In other words, the higher the value of the critical factor, the lower the stability of the 
Pareto-efficient equilibrium, given that the number of discount factors which guarantee the 
stability of the agreement will be less.   3
Let us suppose that there is a bargaining process according to which the agents 
choose the generalized Nash-bargaining solution. That is to say, they choose the stationary 
trajectory of amounts that maximize the product of the utilities normalized by the levels 
associated with the non-cooperative equilibrium. Formally: 
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where β ∈  [0,1] is a parameter which represents the bargaining power of the parents and 
thus, 1-β   indicates the bargaining power of the child. The resolution gives rise to levels of 
consumption of leisure and time dedicated to the family good and private consumption. 
Under symmetric preferences, the behaviour of the agent who deviates is the same 
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The resolution gives rise to levels of private consumption, and provision of the family 
public good and leisure time. 
 
3. Stability of cooperation 
In accordance with the trigger strategy, the condition that the discount factor will be less or 
equal to the corresponding critical factor, implies that, for each member of the family, the 
surplus associated with deviation does not compensate for the fact that it will be impossible 
to return to cooperation in the future. The gains of cooperation for the parents and the child 
are given as:  
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In Figures 1 and 2, we can observe how a greater bargaining power of the parents (a 
greater β) allows them to take a greater profit from cooperation for all values of α and s . By 
contrast, for the case of the adult child, Figures 3 and 4 show that a greater bargaining 
power of the parents leads to a lesser bargaining power of the child, and consequently a 
lesser profit for the child from the agreement.  
We now proceed with the evolution of the critical discount factor with respect to 
bargaining power. In order to calculate the threshold discount factor, the numerator is: 
 
whereas the denominator is given by the difference between the welfare associated with 
equilibrium in the deviation, and the welfare derived from the non-cooperative equilibrium, 
for both parents and child, respectively: 
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Figure 1  ( ) 2 , 1 ( , 2 . 0 = = i β )                                             Figure 2 () 2 , 1 ( , 9 . 0 = = i β ) 
                                                
 












         














Figure 3    (2 . 0 = β )                                                           Figure 4 (9 . 0 = β ) 
































































In Figures 5 and 6 we can see that a greater bargaining power significantly reduces 
the critical discount factor of the parents, for the same values of α and s. Clearly, there is a 
difference between the maximum values, around 0.7 for β =0.2, and 0.42 for β = 0. It is also 
observable that the slope of the surface in the case of the greater bargaining power of the 
parents is more pronounced, and thus, the maximum value is less and decreases faster as s 
increases, with  this being especially clear for higher values of α . 
 
Figure 5  () 2 , 1 ( , 2 . 0 = = i β )                                  Figure 6 () 2 , 1 ( , 9 . 0 = = i β ) 

















For the adult child, the opposite holds. Figures 7 and 8 show that the greater 
bargaining power of the parents implies a greater critical discount factor for the same values 
of α and s. Further, in our example, 9 . 0 = β , the minimum value of the critical discount 
factor of the parents is much greater than the maximum value of that factor for the adult 
child, 2 . 0 = β . Hence, a lesser sensitivity with respect to the altruism variable, s, for high 
values of β in the case of the parents, moves the surface and produces a gentler slope as α 
increases. 
In summary, the greater bargaining power of the parents allows them to take greater 
gains from the cooperation, and reduce the incentives to deviate from the cooperative 
agreement. In the presence of altruism between the players, and given the maximization of 
individual wellbeing, a change in bargaining power in either direction will significantly 
affect the gains of cooperation, as well as the incentives for the adult child to deviate. In 
general, the existence of altruism, even if one of the agents has the greater bargaining 
power, will significantly reduce the values of the individual critical discount factors, thus 
reducing the probability that there will be incentives to break the cooperative agreement. A 
higher level of altruism increases the stability of cooperation, and will overcome the 

































































Andaluz, J. and Molina J.A. (2007a) "How do Altruistic Parental Transfers Affect the 
Welfare Gains of Marriage?”  Research in Economics 61, 1-9. 
Andaluz, J. and Molina J.A. (2007b) "On the Sustainability of Bargaining Solutions in 
Family Decision Models”  Review of Economics of the Household (forthcoming). 
Chen, Z. and Woolley, F. (2001):  “A Cournot-Nash Model of Family Decision Making”  
The Economic Journal 3, 722-748. 
Lundberg and Pollak (1993):  “Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market”   
Journal of Political Economy 101,  988-1010. 
Lundberg and Pollak (1994):  “Noncooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage”  The 
American Economic Review 84, pp. 132-137. 
Lundberg, S. and Pollak, R. (2003) “Efficiency in Marriage” Review of Economics of the 
Household 1, 153-167. 
Manser, M. and Brown, M. (1980) “Marriage and Household Decision-making: A 
Bargaining Analysis” International Economic Review 21, 31–44. 
McElroy, M. and Horney, M. (1981) “Nash-bargained Household Decisions: Toward a 









































 0.99  0.01 
0.99 
s
α